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Population statistics
In the latter half of the 20th century, largely thanks to the 
discovery of oil in the region, all political entities of the Gulf 
transformed themselves from desert sheikhdoms into modem 
states. This process was accompanied by the rapid population 
growth1. The Sultanate of Oman has followed the suit. The 
population of the country grew from around 400 thousand in 
1950 to 3 million in 2004: more than sevenfold (Table l)2. 
1 For the population data see A. Kapiszewski, National and Expatriates. Population 
and Labor Dilemmas of the GCC States (Reading, Ithaca Press, 2001), pp. 33-47. 
2 There is a considerable discrepancy between the 2003 Population Census data and 
other, including official Omani information concerning the population of the country. 
The official Omani statistical data provided in successive Statistical Yearbooks 
showed the Omani population in 2000 - 2, 402, 000; 2001 - 2, 478, 000; 2002 - 
2, 538, 000 only to go down by 2003 Census data. According to various sources, the 
2003 Census population numbers are underestimated. 
Table 1. Oman. Population growth, 1950-2004 (in thousands)
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2003 2004
413“ 505* 654* l, 060b l, 625b 2, 402k 2, 34 Ie 2, 903d
Sources: " Gulf Statistical Profile, Table 5. 2, p. 201; b Oman Statistical Yearbook 2004, 
www. moneoman. gov. om; c 2003 Population Census, Oman Statistical Yearbook 2004; d 
CIA World Factbook 2004, www. cia. gov. 
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The average annual population growth rate maintained a steady 
increase from about 2. 0 percent in 1950s to 5. 5 percent in 1985, 
when it begun to decrease to about 3. 0 percent in the 2000s3. 
But even such growth placed Oman in the years 2000-2005 
among the world top ten countries in terms of population 
growth rates. According to the UN Population Division this 
trend will continue and the Omani population will triple in the 
next 50 years, reaching 9 million in the year 20504. 
3 www. econstats. com. 
4 To be exact, the United Nations Population Division projected the Omani population 
to reach 8, 751, 000. 
This increase of the Omani population has not been 
caused by the indigenous population alone but by the influx of 
foreign workers as well. The employment of foreigners was 
a structural imperative for growth in Oman, as development 
depended upon the importation of foreign technologies and 
required knowledge and skills alien to the local Arab popula­
tion. In consequence, foreign workers have become an important 
part of the labour force in most sectors of economy and the 
government bureaucracy. 
Table 2. Oman. Populations of nationals and expatriates, 1975- 
2004 (in thousands)
Nationals Expatriates Total
1975" 650 132 782
1985b 1, 102 314 1, 416
1995b 1, 557 574 2, 131
2003' 1, 782 559 2, 341
2004d 2, 326 577 2, 903
Source·. ‘ Birks: ‘The demographic challenge’, Table 7. 7, p. 147; b Oman Statistical 
Yearbook 2004, www. moneoman. gov. om; ' 2003 Population Census, Oman Statistical 
Yearbook 2004; d CIA World Factbook 2004, www. cia. gov. 
The percentage of expatriates in the total population grew from 
approximately 17 per cent in 1975 to 27 per cent in 1995 (Table 
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2 and 4). The situation began to change, however, at the turn of 
the century. Omanization policies (see below) finally reverse 
this process and in 2004 the population of Omani nationals went 
up to 80 per cent, reaching its level from 1970s (Table 3). 
Table 3. Oman. Percentage of nationals in population, 1975- 
2004
1975 1985 1995 2004
83. 1 77. 8 73. 1 80. 1
Source'. Table 2. 
Table 4. Oman. Percentage of expatriates in population, 1975- 
2004
1975 1985 1995 2004
16. 9 22. 2 26. 9 19. 9
Source: Table 2. 
The Omani government have tried to change this proportion by 
adopting pronatalist policies that enlarge the size of national 
population. First of all, the authorities have devoted substantial 
funds to improving healthcare services and promoting hygiene, 
proper nutrition and healthy living as a way to increase the 
number of nationals. Due to these efforts, infant and maternal 
mortality rates have fallen sharply, being about four times lower 
than the world’s average at the turn of the century (Table 5). 
Meanwhile, life expectancy at birth has gone up considerably, 
rising by approx. 25 years in the last few decades and being 
almost ten years above the world’s average. 
In order to encourage national couples to have more 
children, a number of incentives were introduced, including 
special housing loans or even free government housing for some 
low-income nationals, allowances for families according to the 
number of children or fully paid maternity holidays. 
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5. 0 87 10 76. 3 71. 0
Source·. The World Health Report 2004, Annex, Tables 1 and 7, pp. 116 and 152 and 
Ministry of Health information. 
Notes: (1) - 2002, children bom/women; (2) - 2000, per 100, 000 live births; (3) - 2000, 
per 1, 000 live births; (4) and (5) - 2002, in years at birth. 
Effects of pronatalist policies are, however, difficult to 
evaluate fully, as statistics of fertility rates published rarely sepa­
rate data for nationals and expatriates. In general, the fertility rate 
in Oman has been very high, much higher than the world’s aver­
age. Nevertheless, in the last decades it has been decreasing. 
While in relative terms, the pronatalist policies have 
brought some positive results, their overall effects on population 
structure have been negligible. The ratio of nationals to expatri­
ates, has not been much influenced by these policies. Moreover, 
as expatriate labour often provides for consumption needs, the 
need for foreign workers can increase with population growth of 
the local population5. The pronatalist policies have also caused 
some problems for the authorities. The enlarged young section of 
the population becomes a socio-economic, if not political, burden 
and a potential factor of instability, especially as unemployment 
grows. Therefore, the government have tried to limit the overall 
number of expatriates by administrative means and to replace 
them by nationals at work (see below). 
5 A. Hossein, V. Nowshirvani and M. Jaber, Economic Development in the GCC. The 
Blessing and the Course of Oil (Greenwich, Connecticut, JAI Press, 1997), p. 73. 
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Heterogeneity of the population
The Omani population has not only been divided between citi­
zens and temporary foreign workers. Even the nationals consti­
tute a diversified group of people. Among them there are still 
highly distinguishable members of various tribes, ethnic or re­
ligious minority groups. Their group identification and percep­
tion by others have been related to the not-so-distant history of 
the country, when the interior, Muscat and Dhofar regions, as 
well as African territories were separate administrative entities, 
in case of the interior and Muscat additionally divided by the 
religious differences. Thus, in modem Oman there are still 
“Ibadis” (about 75 percent of the total population), coastal 
“Shiites”, “Dhofaris”, “Zanzibaris” (or more general “Swahilis” 
as they originated not only from the island, but also from Tan­
ganyika and Central Africa). The Muscat-Matrah urban area has 
long been home to remarkable numbers of Persians (Iranians) 
and of merchants of Indian ancestry, some of whom also live 
along the al-Batina. Famous among the latter are the Liwatiyah, 
who originally came from Sindh (now in Pakistan) but have 
lived in Oman for centuries. The Omani Indian communities are 
mainly Shi’ites with a few Hindus. Besides majority Arabs, 
there is a large separate group of Baluchis. Finally, deep divi­
sions exist between certain tribes (for example Al Bu Sa'id, Al 
Hindi, Al Gaffi). Nevertheless, most of the local passport hold­
ers are quite well integrated in the community which began to 
posses the attributes of the modem nation-state. This has hap­
pened thanks to the work of Sultan Qaboos who, after becoming 
the ruler of the country in 1970 and successfully handling 
problems caused by the Dhofar uprising, made national integra­
tion one of the major issues of his policies. Only occasionally, 
in the social context, members of certain local groups, as well as 
naturalised foreigners are considered ‘not real Omani’ by other 
nationals. 
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In turn, the expatriate population is also highly diversi­
fied. Major expatriate groups in Oman consist of Indians (ap­
prox. 330, 000), Bangladeshis (approx. 110, 000), Pakistanis 
(approx. 70, 000), Sri Lankans (approx. 30, 000) and Egyptians 
(approx. 30, 000)6. 
6 Data from the appropriate government departments as reported in Human Rights 
Watch reports for 2004. 
Nationals and expatriates in the workforce
Although the number of Omanis in the total population greatly 
exceeds the number of expatriates almost at the rate of three to 
one, the latter dominate the labour market. In 2003, there were 
58 per cent expatriates in the Omani workforce (Table 6). 
Table 6, Nationals and expatriates in the Omani workforce, 
1995, 2003
nationals expatriates Total
1995 270, 000 496, 200 766, 200
2003 312, 446 424, 178 736, 64
Source: 1995 - Ministry of Development estimates, Five-Year Development Plan ¡996- 
2000 (Muscat, 1996), p. 114; 2003 - Population Census, Oman Statistical Yearbook 
2004. 
For several decades, the number of foreign workers has grown 
steadily along with the economic development of Oman. 
Growing at the same time was the expatriate share in the total 
workforce; it went up from about 35 per cent in 1975 to about 
65 per cent in 1995. Only more recently, after 1995, did the 
overall situation begin to change, and a development that has 
resulted in the decrease of average representation of expatriates 
in the overall workforce is visible. 
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On the contrary, the percentage of nationals in the 
workforce has decreased from 65 per cent in 1975 to about 35 
per cent in 1995, only to shift to approximately 42 per cent by 
2003. Oman, along with Bahrain, has the highest percentage of 
working nationals among the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) 
states. 
A large expatriate presence in the Omani workforce is 
expected to continue in the years to come. The popular convic­
tion that demand for foreign labour is only transient, as “in es­
sence it is a demand for foreign skills that GCC nationals are in 
the process of developing”, is not necessarily true7. The overall 
educational gap between nationals and foreign workers is not 
particularly large and the number of unskilled, illiterate foreign 
workers, who have little to offer nationals in terms of “know­
how” transfer, is very high, ranging from 30 to 50 per cent8. 
Contrary to the long-term interests of nationals, the attention 
paid to the low wages of such workers is often greater than the 
understanding of negative effects of their large presence. 
7 S. Al-Qudsi, Labour Markets and Policy in the GCC: Micro Diagnostics and Macro 
Profiles (Emirates Lecture Series, Abu Dhabi, The Emirates Center for Strategic 
Studies and Research, 1998), p. 24. 
8 Ibidem, pp. 29-31 and 46. 
9 The Economic Activity Rate. 
It also has to be remembered that the expatriate inflow 
is a self-feeding process. The employment of foreign workers 
increases the demand for housing, services, consumer and other 
goods, creating an additional demand for manpower that can be 
met only by greater immigration. 
The ratio of the workforce to the total population is 
high, mainly because of the size of the expatriate workforce. 
The Economic Activity Rate is Oman in 2003 was 31 per cent, 
that is comparable to rates in other countries at a similar level of 
economic development and with comparable per capita income, 
but much lower than in highly developed countries (for exam­
ple, in the US, the rate was 51 per cent in 2000)9. Economic 
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Activity Rates, naturally, differ a greatly between nationals and 
expatriates. The national workforce in Oman is small, lower 
than is to be expected from the size of the national population. 
Only 17. 5 per cent of Omanis work, as compared to 76 per cent 
of expatriates. Thus, each employed national has, on average, 
five dependants. In sharp contrast, each expatriate worker has 
on average only 0. 3 accompanying family members. 
There are several reasons for the low Economic Activ­
ity Rate of Omanis. First of all, the national population is very 
young, with large proportion of people aged below 15. There­
fore, only a relatively small proportion falls within the eco­
nomically active age group. Second, there is still only limited 
employment of women (see below). Finally, many working-age 
men of Omani nationality do not actually participate in the la­
bour market because of the reduced economic necessity to do 
so: a circumstance that is exacerbated by a low retirement age. 
In contrast, the foreign labour force has a high Economic Ac­
tivity Rate as a result of the dominance of single male workers 
and a lack of non-working expatriates, young and old. 
The Economic Activity Rates for Omani nationals re­
mained basically the same in the last decade. This shows that 
various attempts by the government to increase the number of 
working nationals have not been as successful as they could (in 
particular, the participation of women in the workforce did not 
increase much). At the same time, the Economic Activity Rate 
for expatriates decreased slightly, showing that their overall 
status in the society increased (they have been able to have 
more dependants). 
Alongside the state policies of providing jobs to all na­
tionals is the fact that the majority of them have been employed 
in the public sector. This is a paradox in countries with very 
liberal economic policies and free markets, but it is largely 
caused by the fact that salaries and other benefits in the public 
sector are quite attractive for nationals as compared to the de­
mand for labour in the competitive, profit-oriented private sec­
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tor. In Oman, 62. 6 per cent of nationals were employed in the 
public sector in 2003, while 27. 4 per cent were employed in the 
private sector10 *. 
10 Population Census 2003, Oman Statistical Yearbook 2004 (Muscat, Ministry of 
Development), Table 23-2. 
" Ibidem, Table 16-2. 
12 Ibidem, Table 17-2. 
Women in the population and in the workforce
Women constitute a minority of the population of Oman due to 
the large number of single male expatriates as well as 
restrictions placed on the residence of expatriate women. Only 
certain categories of foreigners are allowed to bring their 
families with them, one criterion being the minimum required 
salary. In 2003, there were 1, 027, 576 women in the total 
population, that is 43. 9 per cent. That proportion slightly 
increased in the last decade; for example, there was 41. 4 per 
cent women the total population in 1997, showing more liberal 
attitude to bringing in foreign female workers and possibility to 
increase a number of female dependants. 
While Omani women have constituted about 50 per 
cent of the national population (49. 5 per cent in 2003), the 
expatriate women were at that time responsible only for 26. 2 
per cent of the foreign population. Therefore, the ratio of 
expatriate men to women was almost 3: 1. 
The female workforce in Oman continues to be small, 
at 15 per cent of the total; in 2003, there were 113, 632 women 
in the total workforce of 736, 624”. 
The Omani female workforce is over 17 per cent of the 
total Omani workforce; in 2003 there were 53, 791 Omani 
women in the total Omani workforce of 312, 44612. That 
percentage has been steadily going up in recent years; for 
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example a decade earlier, in 1993, there were fewer than 10 per 
cent of Omani women in the total Omani workforce13. 
A. Kapiszewski, Nationals and Expatriates, p. 108. 
14 Population Ccnsus 2003, Table 18-2. 
15 Ibidem, Table 23-2. 
16 Ibidem, Table 20-2. 
The expatriate female workforce accounts for 14 per 
cent of the total expatriate workforce; in 2003 there were 59, 841 
expatriate women in the total expatriate workforce of 414, 17814. 
That percentage was much less than a decade earlier (19 per 
cent), probably because of the growing number of Omani 
women going to work. 
As a small percentage of national women work, their 
Economic Activity Rate is low -6. 1, much lower, as might be 
expected, than in the case of men (28. 7), but in the upward 
trend; in 1993 the Economic Activity Rate for Omani women 
was 3. 5. In contrast, the Economic Activity Rate of expatriate 
women is quite high, over 40 per cent. 
The majority of national women work in the public 
sector which provides higher salaries and accommodates better 
their needs for flexible working hours. Moreover, the public 
sector provides them with protection, shielding them from the 
necessity of dealing with a large number of persons, usually 
foreign men, as is the case in the private sector. In 2003, 63. 3 
per cent of female Omani workforce was employed in the 
public sector, as compared to 26. 6 in the private one, 
interestingly enough in both cases almost the same percentage 
as for Omani men15. Thirty-nine per cent of Omani women 
worked in education, 15 per cent in public administration, and 
14 per cent in health and social work16. 
The increase in the employment of national women is 
expected to continue in the near future, because of the economic 
necessities, more liberal attitudes towards the employment of 
women in society at large, the strong interest among many 
national women in working, the improvement of educational 
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facilities for women and the shortage of national men to fulfil 
the needs of the market. 
Although a part of national public opinion might still be 
against the idea of working women, the authorities have become 
strong supporters of enhancing their public role and their 
employment. In 1994, Sultan Qaboos nominated the first two 
women to the State Consultative Council (Majlis al-Shura). 
Opening the Council session, he called on Omani women “to 
roll up their sleeves and contribute to the process of economic 
and social development [... ]. The country needs every pair of 
hands”17. On another occasion he said, that “if the energy, 
capability and enthusiasm of women were excluded from 
a country’s public life, that country would deprive itself of 50 
per cent of its genius”18. Further promoting the role of women 
in public affairs, in 1997, he allowed national women to 
participate in the elections (the first such case in the GCC 
countries) and later nominated four of them to the newly 
established Council of Oman. In 1998-1999, the Sultan 
appointed the first woman ambassador, named three women 
under-secretaries in the Omani government and one a member 
of the board of the chamber of commerce and industry. In 2003, 
he appointed a woman to become President of the Public 
Authority for the Craft Industries at the rank of a minister. 
Finally, in 2004 the Sultan appointed three other women to the 
cabinet, to manage the Higher Education, Tourism and Social 
Development Ministries. Moreover, five female lawyers were 
appointed as attorney generals, the only such case in the GCC 
states. In turn, among the religious leaders of the GCC 
countries, the Mufti of Muscat stands apart as being the only 
one to give his blessings to the inclusion of women in the 
political process19. 
17 Khaleej Times, 4 September 1994. 
18 K. Thomas, ‘A velvet revolution’, Arables Trends (April) 1999, p. 34. 
19 C. J. Riphenburg, Oman: Political Development in a Changing World (Westport, 
Connecticut, Praeger, 1998), p. 152. 
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Policies towards foreign labour
Policies towards foreign labour have been designed to secure 
the preservation of the existing regime and the dominant posi­
tion of the national population. They are based on the following 
principles: rigorous laws regulating the entry, residence and 
employment of foreigners; rotation of the migrant workforce; 
preference for labour from certain regions; and last but not least, 
rigid restrictions on naturalisation. 
Laws regulating the entry and employment of foreign­
ers have generally been restrictive. Except for the citizens of the 
GCC countries and a few other exceptions nobody can enter 
a country without a proper visa, which in most cases requires 
a local sponsor. When the purpose of entry is employment, the 
application has to be made by the future employer, in which 
case residency and work permits issued by the Ministries of the 
Interior and Social Affairs, Labour and Vocational Training, are 
also necessary. Work permits and entry visas are issued only 
when taking into consideration age, health, competence and 
qualifications for the job in question, and sometimes also ‘good 
reputation and behaviour’. Residency visas are granted for 
a limited period of time, not exceeding five years. Work permits 
have to be renewed regularly, often annually, and when can­
celled the residency permits become invalid. Changing the type 
of visa (for example from tourist to residency) is restricted, as is 
the possibility of changing employer (which usually requires the 
prior consent of the first sponsor and the authorities). In such 
situations the person is often required to leave the country for 
a certain period of time before being granted a new contract and 
work permit. The local sponsor is responsible, at least on paper, 
for the conduct of the employee and is obliged to ensure that he 
or she is employed in accordance with legislation. In reality, the 
foreign workers can be hired and fired at the will of their em­
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ployers. Moreover, authorities can terminate residency and 
working permits at any time. To secure even better control of 
foreign labour, employees are generally required to cede their 
passports to the employer for the duration of their stay in the 
country. 
Despite the existence of all these restrictive regulations, 
the rotation of the workforce has proved impossible to achieve 
as planned. The free market economy has been more powerful 
than the policies the authorities would like to implement. The 
majority of expatriates have stayed beyond the term of the 
original contract, as employers usually prefer to hire workers 
with local experience rather than bring in new ones. Moreover, 
bringing in a new worker involves additional costs to the 
company. As a result, the average period of time that foreign 
workers have spent in Oman has been growing and the number 
of practically, though not formally, permanent workers has 
increased. 
In turn, the policies regarding preferences for labour 
from certain countries have essentially accomplished their 
goals. In particular, the number of non-Gulf Arab workers, 
Palestinians in particular, was kept low while the number of 
Asians was high. 
Finally, policies regulating naturalisation and 
citizenship have been most strictly enforced, successfully limiting 
the possible enlargement of privileged local populations by 
foreign elements. One has to be resident for 20 years to have the 
right to apply for the citizenship; this requirement is reduced to 
10 years if the applicant has been married to an Omani. Because 
of such restrictions, very few people have been naturalized; for 
example between 1986 to 1996 only 1, 861 foreigners were able 
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to obtain such status20. Most of them were Arab women married 
to nationals21.
20 As calculated by the number of passports issued by the Naturalization Department, 
Statistical Yearbook 1996 (Muscat, Ministry of Development).
21 J. al-Jasser, “Naturalization in the Gulf: Ladies come out on top”, Mideast Mirror, 
2nd June 1999.
In due course, however, the authorities realised that the 
size of the foreign workforce grew much beyond the 
government’s expectations and full control over it became 
increasingly difficult. Therefore, they began to introduce different 
measures to deal with the problem.
To discourage foreigners even from considering the 
option of settling down, they have been forbidden, with a few 
exceptions, from owning land, buildings and any other 
immovable property, and barred from entering into a commercial 
venture without a national partner (foreign participation in 
a business must not be a majority share).
To limit the number of non-productive foreigners re­
siding in the country, expatriate workers are prohibited from 
bringing in their family members unless they eam above a cer­
tain limit. Male children above the age of 18 are not allowed to 
stay with their parents unless they work or study in the country 
under different sponsorship. To limit the number of foreigners 
further, employment contracts are generally not renewed for 
expatriates reaching the retirement age of 60.
Then, the government have made employment of for­
eigners more expensive. For that reason the costs of labour 
cards, work and resident permits, entry and exit visas and health 
cards as well as the costs of subsidised services for expatriates 
have continually increased. In 1994, the government introduced 
a tax for hiring foreign workers. The tax ranges from 60 rials 
($157) annually for each expatriate employee in the private 
sector to 70 rials ($184) for each domestic helper. Secondly, to 
reduce the number of foreigners further, amnesties have been 
regularly granted to non legally residing foreigners (that is, 
Population and Workforce in Oman 259
without a proper visa), allowing them to leave the country vol­
untarily without punishment. At the same time, tough penalties 
were introduced for illegal employment, with sentences to be 
served in prisons and substantial fines for both the illegal la­
bourers and the nationals employing or sheltering them. The 
administrative deportations of non-legalized residents have been 
also practised.
Finally, to limit further the increase in the number of 
foreign workers, especially unskilled, the authorities have been 
trying to develop high-tech manufacturing and services which 
are not labour-intensive and do not need large on-site field 
personnel.
All the policies aimed to limit the numbers of the 
foreign labourers have neither been strict enough, nor fully 
implemented . In reality, they have often been losing the battle 
with the forces of the free market. A laissez-faire approach to 
the import of foreign labour continues to enjoy a strong support 
from the politically powerful lobbies of trading and merchant 
families whose fortunes have to a large extent been built thanks 
to expatriate workers.
Localisation of the labour market
Omanisation (often also called localisation, nationalisation or 
indigenisation) are terms used to describe policies leading to the 
replacement of expatriate labour by nationals. The Omani 
authorities try to implement such policies to provide jobs for all 
citizens, and also because they understand well the security- 
related, economic, social and cultural risks coming from the 
existence of large communities of foreigners on their territory.
The localisation of jobs in Oman went on the 
government’s agenda very early. The Education and Training 
Council chaired by the Sultan was already established in 1977. 
The Third Five-Year Development Plan (1980-1985) paid much 
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attention to this issue. The Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Labour through its Directorate General of Vocational Training 
established several Vocational Training Institutes in different 
regions of the Sultanate in the mid-1980s. In hardly any time at 
all, they began to offer numerous commercial and technical 
courses for nationals. Oman Technical and Industrial College, 
the Institute of Health Services, the Institute of Public 
Administration and the Institute for Bankers were set up as 
well22. State-owned oil companies, such as Oman Petroleum 
Development and Oman Refinery Company established in­
service training and educational programs for their Omani 
employees. At the same time, the authorities began to involve 
the private sector in such programs. In the early 1980s, the 
Training-Levy Rebate Scheme was introduced to reimburse the 
costs of training courses for Omani nationals to private 
employers.
22 J. S. Birks and C. A. Sinclair, ‘Successful education and human resource develop­
ment - the key to sustained economic growth’, in B. R. Pridham (ed.), Oman: Econo­
mic, Social and Strategic Developments (London, Croom Helm, 1987), pp. 145-65.
23 The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, (March) 1999, p. 74.
24 Interview with Ahmed bin Abdulnabi Macki, Minister of Economy, Khaleej Times, 
4th January 2006.
The first sector the government decided to nationalise 
was the banking sector, attractive for nationals thanks to high 
salaries and the prestige associated with the job. Omanis quickly 
dominated this sector and in the 1990s already constituted 85 
per cent of all bank employees. Programs to Omanise fully 
some other sectors, nursing for example, were established as 
well. At the primary school level, 95 per cent of teachers are 
Omanis already; in the whole public school system 57 per cent 
of teachers were nationals in 199923. Altogether, 81.8 per cent 
of all government employees (excluding military) were Omanis 
by 2005, with several government departments becoming 
almost 100 per cent localised24.
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In 1994, Oman became the first country in the GCC to 
introduce legal requirements for the localisation of the private 
sector. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour imposed an 
Omanisation percentage according to a sectored quota system: 
banking - 90 per cent; transport, storage and communication - 
60‘ per cent; finance, insurance and real estate - 45 per cent; 
hotels and restaurants - 30 per cent; wholesale and retail - 20 
per cent; and contracting - 15 per cent. Several categories of 
jobs, such as fishing, animal husbandry, driving light vehicles or 
practising traditional handicrafts, were reserved for nationals 
only. The plan aimed to increase the percentage of Omanis in 
the private sector to 27 per cent by the year 2000 (from 17 per 
cent in 1995), which would bring the overall localisation of the 
workforce to 40 per cent.
Companies were asked to reach the targeted 
percentages on time or face heavy fines, the denial of visas for 
importing labour and the loss of public contracts for failing to 
comply. Nevertheless, the implementation of this ambitious 
program had to be postponed. Most of the private companies 
were not ready to fulfil the legal obligations, claiming lack of 
sufficient numbers of properly skilled Omanis to take jobs over 
from expatriates. The truth, however, was that all too often, 
private companies did not take the issue seriously and did very 
little or nothing about it. The attitude of the private sector was, 
and still is, somewhat opportunistic and there has been evidence 
of “crash management hire-an-Omani-somehow” techniques to 
win favour with the government25. Another major problem has 
been the different salary expectations between expatriate and 
local labour. Many expatriates from Asia are ready to work for 
60 rials ($160) a month while the minimum wage required for 
an Omani secondary school graduate is 200 rials ($550). Private 
25 F. Al-Farsi, ‘Omanisation and faculty development in Sultan Qaboos University’, in 
K. E. Shaw (ed), Higher Educationin the Gulf: Problems and Prospects (Exeter, 
Exeter University Press, 1997), p. 183.
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companies prefer, of course, to employ the former. Never­
theless, thanks to the government involvement, the rate of 
localisation in the private sector reached 25 percent in 2005 
(increasing from 16.4 in 2000)26.
26 Interview with Ahmed bin Abdulnabi Macki, Minister of Economy, Khaleej Tinies, 
4th January 2006 .
27 Royal Decree No. 1 /96, Official Gazette, January 1996 .
In the mean time, the Omanisation policy and the quota 
system in particular were outlined in the Fifth Five-Year 
Development Plan (1996-2000) as well as in the Sixth (2001- 
2005). It was stated there that, along with Sultan Qaboos’ vision 
for Oman’s economy, there was a need to attach a greater 
importance to human resource development. This means 
“upgrading and developing ... basic education to the level of 
distinguished international standards”, and “expanding the area 
of technical education and vocational training, and directing 
most of the basic education graduates towards these areas”27. At 
the same time, it was also expected that the unemployment 
should substantially go down and the Omanisation of the labour 
force should increase.
To fulfil these goals, to oversee all issues related to 
vocational education and in particular to ensure that vocational 
training meets the needs of the private sector employers, the 
Supreme Committee for Vocational Training and Labour was 
established (replacing former bodies of this kind). Ministers of 
national economy, commerce, industry and development 
became it members. The Committee’s executive arm, the 
Vocational Training Authority, has been entrusted with the task 
of initiating programs to increase the number of trained 
professionals and technicians. Thanks to the Authority’s 
initiatives, several technical colleges and vocational training 
centres have been established. Many private institutes offering 
training in business, computer skills and accounting have 
opened as well. Moreover, significant budget allocations have 
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been made for training schemes for nationals, including ones for 
women. The government has also decided to use for that 
purpose funds generated from the tax imposed on companies for 
hiring expatriate workers. The authorities have also expanded 
earlier schemes and have begun to reimburse private companies 
for employing Omanis, covering the entire cost of their in-job 
training and 50-80 per cent of their salaries for the first few 
months.
The Vocational Training Authority has adopted the 
British National Vocational Qualification System to help boost 
human resource development. It puts equal emphasis on real- 
life experience and classroom theory, and - to a large extent - 
satisfactorily tackles the problem of secondary school leavers. 
Only those educational institutions which satisfy the system’s 
requirements are entitled to apply for government subsidies. To 
expand educational possibilities further, as Sultan Qaboos 
University and a few other existing public colleges can enrol 
only about 15 per cent of high school graduates, the 
establishment of private colleges has been allowed. The 
government believes that with all these measures adopted, it 
will be possible to increase the enrolment of nationals in 
technical and vocational education significantly. At the same 
time, the Chairman of the State Council, Sheikh Hamud al- 
Harifhi, warned men in Oman “against the consequences of 
their laziness, because women are taking their due role in all 
ministries, establishments and areas of production and are 
scoring superior positions”28. As national women won the 
majority of university seats, the state intervened and had the 
enrolment percentage equalled between males and females.
Other actions have been initiated as well. First of all, 
the Omani government decided, in 1997, to require the early 
retirement of more than a fourth of its civil service, to secure in 
such a way a number of jobs for young nationals. Secondly, 
28 Reuters, 25 June, 1999.
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1998 (and later, 1999 as well) were proclaimed the Year of the 
Private Sector, with the aim of promoting further development 
of this sector and the localisation of private establishments. In 
particular, companies employing a large number of Omanis and 
organising training programs for them became eligible for 
special “green cards” from the (renamed) Ministry of Social 
Affairs, Labour and Vocational Training, giving them priority in 
expediting their labour-related transactions at the Ministry. To 
help to eradicate unemployment among graduates, the Fund for 
the Development of Youth Projects was launched in 1998, the 
first of its kind in the Gulf. Sultan Qaboos and other members 
of the royal family were the first donors to the fund. Finally, a 
decision was reached to begin implementing strictly the 1994 
law and fine establishments that do not meet the quota 
requirements. Petrol stations were the first companies where 
this measure was adopted. The authorities suspended labour 
cards of expatriate employees in gas stations which are not 50 
per cent Omanised. In the next step, all school bus and tractor 
driver positions were set aside for nationals29. Hairdressers, 
tailors and gas distributors were added to the list of occupations 
reserved for Omanis only. Moreover, the government asked all 
private companies employing 50 or more local workers to have 
an Omani director of personnel by the end of 1999 and 
announced that it would no longer grant expansion loans to 
companies that had not reach Omanisation targets. The 
authorities stress that they do not intend to Omanise positions if 
there were a negative repercussion on productivity or the quality 
of services provided. Nevertheless, the restrictions result in 
a certain amount of complaints both from nationals and 
expatriates. As the Economist Intelligence Unit experts 
29 This decision has not been easy to implement. For example, as Oman Observer 
noted, many Omanis “are not able to operate the sophisticated mowers, bailers, rakers, 
etc ”. Moreover, small farmers have financial worries related to the ban. Omani tractor 
drivers charge 120 rials ($307) a month compared to 70 rials ($180) for Asian 
workers.
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remarked: “the forced complete Omanisation of basic services 
as such as the supply of cooking gas cylinders, on which 
a substantial portion of the country depends, will leave the 
government open to particular criticism if Omanis who take 
these jobs are not responsive to after-hours or weekend calls. 
There will no doubt be some early difficulties, but the 
government is unlikely to rescind the order as it comes under 
increasing pressure from unemployment”30.
30 EIU, Oman. Country Report (2nd quarter 1999), p. 15.
31 Gulf News, 5 May 1998.
32 EIU, Oman. Country Report (4th quarter 1998), p. 13.
33 A. Μ. S. Al-Lamky, Higher Education in Oman: Perceptions of University 
Graduates in the Context of Dependent Development, 1970-1990 (Ph D. thesis, The 
George Washington University, 1992), p. 216.
Localisation has become easier to achieve as the 
attitude of young Omanis towards jobs has changed. Young 
people used to want to work in the ministries or to begin their 
careers in high managerial posts: now they realise that this is 
often not possible and faced with the threat of unemployment, 
they go to technical or clerical jobs outside the public sector as 
well. The Minister for Social Affairs, Labour and Vocational 
Training, Amur bin Shuwain al-Husni, stressed the importance 
of this approach and said that Omanis should seize the jobs 
available rather than wait for the choicest ones. “We cannot 
wait for foreigners to cook for us, drive our cars and tailor our 
clothes ... no work is inferior”31. Sultan Qaboos went even 
further and denounced what he called ‘the laziness’ of the 
present generation who are no longer willing to perform manual 
labour32.
Despite all these efforts, Omanisation continues to face 
serious problems. In the study by Asya Mohamed Suleiman Al- 
Lamky, 65 per cent of Omani graduates indicated that they were 
not able to replace expatriates at work33. According to Fawzia 
Al-Farsi, the major obstacles to Omanisation are: lack of 
awareness amongst expatriates of their responsibility to train 
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nationals and inadequate cooperation from expatriates in this 
respect as a result of their fear of losing employment, lack of 
clear policy and Omanisation targets; continued preferential 
treatment of expatriates over Omani nationals in the private 
sector; insufficient opportunities for Omanis to be given 
responsibility at work, inappropriate Omani work attitudes and 
limited commitment34. Moreover, the localisation of the 
workforce in Oman, as in other GCC countries, has not been 
welcomed by everybody. Some businessmen have expressed 
their criticism of enforced localisation. They believe that 
“Omanisation cannot be based on converting the private sector 
into charitable institutions, forcing it to absorb nationals”35. 
Others point out that localisation should not be speeded up as 
otherwise serious problems will likely to occur, as for example 
was the case when expatriate water-tanker drivers were replaced 
by nationals, resulting in a poor supply of water36. On the other 
hand, there has also been criticism that localisation policies 
have not been enforced firmly enough. The President of the 
Shura Council, ‘Abdullah bin ‘Ali al-Qatabi, has called in 1998 
for the review of the Omanisation policies since an increasing 
number of expatriates continue to arrive in the Sultanate to take 
up employment37. Moreover, the unemployment of nationals 
stays high: according to official estimations in 2003, more than 
60,000 Omanis under the age of 24 were without jobs38. 
Nevertheless, in comparison with other GCC states, the 
localisation of the Omani workforce has been quite successful 
so far.
34 Al-Farsi, ‘Omanisation’, p. 190.
35 Emirates News, 10 October 1997.
36 E1U Oman. Country Report (1st quarter 1998).
37 Khaleej Times, 23 March 1998.
38 Middle East Economic Digest, 2 May 2003.
